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The 
Golden Gang 
of Three/ 
by ANTONIO A. AMADOR / Regional Tax Director-Asia/Pacific, TRI 
How did three highly successful island economies in the western Pacific achieve their 
solid fiscal records? 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong 
have been cited as having the best 
performing economies in a field of 85 
countries. The U.S. ranked 25th in the 
survey, which covered the period from 
1974 to 1981. 
Using the 1973 oil crisis as the starting 
point, Euromoney, an international 
financial monthly, employed a weighted 
formula of five variables: economic 
growth, rate of inflation, strength of 
SDR (special drawing rights) exchange, 
export growth, and balance of pay-
ments. While most countries blame 
the price of oil as the primary cause of 
sluggish economic growth, the front 
runners ironically have a common 
handicap-a lack of oil to fuel rapid 
industrial expansion. Other similarities 
among Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong are superficial, the study said, and 
can easily be misleading. All are island 
economies that depend on manufac-
turing for export. The population in all 
three is ethnically Chinese. And all 
three have strong central governments. 
The similarities end there. 
The differences, in fact, far outweigh 
the similarities. Singapore is a sovereign 
republic, while Taiwan wants to assert a 
sovereignty that most of the world 
refuses to recognize. Hong Kong is a 
colony where people do not vote and 
are not interested in the vote. Govern-
ment intervention in business is 
markedly strong in Taiwan, selectively 
assertive in Singapore, and compara-
tively weak in Hong Kong. Taiwan has a 
semblance of a primary economic base: 
agriculture. Both Singapore and Hong 
Kong have practically no such base. 
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Hong Kong is ahead in the tertiary 
services sector —banking, finance, 
transport and tourism, social and 
personal services—followed by Singa-
pore. Finally, the fiscal policies of the 
three countries are diverse, although all 
have the objective of raising revenue. 
The fiscal policies of these countries 
will be examined in this article. The 
fiscal strategies employed to achieve 
economic objectives will be surveyed, 
but no attempt will be made to recon-
cile how the different fiscal policies 
achieve the same objective. The 
economic achievements of the three 
countries will be outlined and the 
investment outlook surveyed. 
TAIWAN 
The Organization of Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD), a 
grouping of the world's industrial 
countries, recently nominated Taiwan 
as one of the ten "newly industrialising" 
countries. Dr. Herman Kahn of the 
Hudson Institute in New York attributed 
the Taiwan economic miracle to the 
"fostering of a dedicated, motivated, 
responsible, and educated citizenry and 
a sense of commitment, organizational 
identity, and institutional loyalty." When 
Cesar Virata, the Philippines's prime 
minister, was asked how it was that 
Taiwan was so much ahead of his 
resource-rich country, his answer was 
simply, "Well, they are different. They 
were trained by the Japanese." Indeed, 
Taiwan was occupied by Japan for 
50 years, just as the Philippines was 
under U.S. tutelage for almost 50 years. 
Traditionally, Taiwan was a two-crop 
economy, sugar and rice. When the 
retreating armies of Chiang Kai Shek 
took refuge on the island, the lesson of 
defeat they brought with them was the 
tactic of victory employed by Chairman 
Mao—land for the landless. In 1951, the 
Kuomintang government instituted a 
massive land reform. It also provided 
incentives for raising farm productivity, 
thereby increasing purchasing power. 
With the expansion of the agricultural 
industry, the government turned to 
strengthening the island's physical and 
social infrastructure, in particular 
making education available at all levels. 
This set the environment for growth. 
Today, 95 percent of the young workers 
of Taiwan have received at least eight 
years of education. 
In the late fifties, the economic 
planners developed the manufacture of 
a wide variety of consumer goods. This 
reduced unemployment, further 
increased purchasing power, and 
widened income distribution. To 
encourage private savings and capital 
formation, attractive interest rates were 
coupled with tax incentives. Finally, to 
overcome the limited size of the 
domestic market, export-oriented 
industries received massive government 
assistance in the form of tax relief, soft 
loans, and other measures to be 
discussed below. This strategy suc-
ceeded beyond everyone's expecta-
tions. In the fifties, the total trade 
amounted to about a third of a billion 
U.S. dollars. In a little over two decades, 
it grew to US$24 billion, a 70-fold 
increase. In the fifties, manufacturing 
accounted for less than 14 percent of 
the gross domestic product (GDP). 
Today, it represents more than 
30 percent and is comparable to most 
developed western European econ-
omies. By 1978, this island state of 
17.6 million people was the eighth 
largest trading partner of the U.S. and its 
fourth largest supplier of manufactured 
goods after Japan, Canada, and West 
Germany. 
The government's fiscal policy is 
geared to raising revenues to meet the 
needs of both public investment and 
government services. Sustained 
economic growth increases tax 
revenues, of course. In fact, Taiwan's 
revenues since 1964 have outpaced the 
increase in government investment and 
expenditures—despite inflationary 
obstacles. 
To maintain its growth pace, the 
government has employed imaginative 
fiscal incentives. These measures 
necessarily resulted in lower revenues 
from profits tax, but they did not result 
in a deficit. The government counterbal-
anced this by establishing customs and 
tariff measures which insulated 
domestic industry from outside compe-
tition. However, the tariff wall was built 
with several openings. Doors were 
designed for foreign manufacturers to 
import capital goods with high 
technology. They also were designed 
for manufacturers who will produce 
goods for export, train workers in 
superior production techniques, and 
introduce efficient management and 
marketing strategies. Manufacturers 
who bring new ideas and products may 
own 100 percent of their operations and 
may remit all profits plus repatriate 20 
percent of invested capital annually. 
Thus, the doors are open to go in and 
out. 
In addition to a five-year tax holiday, 
there is an exemption from tariff duties 
for experimental instruments and 
equipment not domestically produced. 
To top these perks, up to 90 percent of 
the total letters of credit for export sales 
will be financed with soft loans, 
generally at about half the prevailing 
discount rate. The purchase of plant 
premises-of up to 70 percent of 
cost—also can be financed with low 
rates for as long as 10 years. Many real 
estate taxes, sale taxes, stamp duties, 
and municipal taxes also have been 
drastically reduced. 
The tax and nontax incentives have 
worked. But will they continue to 
work? The cloud that hangs over Taiwan 
is really the protectionist sentiment in 
the developed countries. Taiwan is 
slowly lowering its tariff walls in 
response to this sentiment. But it will 
need to import greater technology to 
increase the value of its exported 
products. Quality will have to replace 
quantity. Because Taiwan is no longer a 
labour-surplus economy, capital inten-
sity will have to take the place of labour 
intensity. With lower tariff revenues to 
finance the restructuring of industrial 
production, however, it is doubtful 
whether the budget surplus can be 
maintained forever. No longer can the 
10,000 postal savings banks, which 
accept deposits even on Sundays, 
finance the required restructuring of 
industrial production. In about five 
years the economy will mature, and 
with maturity comes an industrial 
economy's problems of deficits and 
inflation. 
On the other hand, Taiwan is not a 
highly leveraged economy. Its foreign 
debt, in fact, is smaller than its foreign 
currency reserves. Taiwan has recourse 
to the world's capital markets. Thus, an 
economy which attains this level of 
industrial development can compete. If 
the "commitment, organizational 
identity, and institutional loyalty" are 
kept intact, Taiwan not only will 
compete, it will compete well. 
SINGAPORE 
Fifty years ago, according to W. 
Somerset Maughan, the busy streets of 
Singapore were filled with rickshaws, 
sweaty, fat Dutchmen, masters of tramp 
steamers, out-of-work mining 
engineers, planters from the Malay 
peninsula on vacation, wealthy 
merchants giving lavish luncheon 
parties, Chinese, Malays, and Sikhs. The 
characters you meet in Lee Kuan Yew's 
island republic are still the same, except 
their jobs have changed. 
Dutchmen are more likely to be 
shipping executives of container 
shipping lines. The engineers are 
probably designers of rigs. After all, 
Singapore is the world's largest builder 
of jack-up rigs and the second largest 
builder of submersibles. The planters on 
holiday of 50 years ago are today log 
exporters from Sarawak and Sabah. The 
luncheon parties are replaced by 
bankers' closing cocktail parties. The 
population is still Chinese, Malay, and 
Indian. Richshaws, however, have given 
way to Datsuns. 
The British East India Company 
founded Singapore as a trading station 
more than 160 years ago. Entrepot trade 
and commerce was and still is an 
important element (about 25 percent) 
in the composition of Singapore's GDR 
Transport (14 percent), manufacturing 
(27 percent), financial and business 
services (15 percent) basically make up 
the economy of this island state of 
about 2.4 million people. The financial 
sector was the fastest growing industry 
last year. It is the sexy sector of the 
economy. The government is actively 
pursuing its expansion as the pay scales 
in this vibrant area begin to compare 
with most western economies. 
Manufacturing, however, remains the 
largest component of the GDP and still 
rates high on the scale of government 
priority. 
The economy grew at an inflation 
adjusted rate of 10.2 percent in 1980. The 
government hopes to maintain the 
momentum between 8 to 10 percent 
growth annually over the next decade, a 
projection that is not really out of line 
with other nations in the region. This 
rate of expansion is about two to three 
times greater than in Europe and North 
America. 
A disciplined work force, constantly 
exhorted by the government propa-
ganda machinery to adopt "the 
Japanese way of thinking," is the stellar 
attraction Singapore offers foreign 
capital. The loft and wings of Singa-
pore's stage are packed with tax and 
nontax incentives. 
For the manufacturing sector-
considered by the government as a 
pioneer industry—a tax relief of five 
years, or a longer period not exceeding 
ten years, is liberally granted. Dividends 
declared out of the exempt income is 
similarly exempt from tax when it 
reaches the hands of investors. And if a 
manufacturing concern contemplates 
expanding its production through 
capital investment of about US$5 
million, it will receive tax relief for five 
years. Similarly, a company engaged in 
the production of goods for export can 
secure a tax relief on its export profits. 
To the commercial and trading sector, 
the government gives a wide variety of 
incentives. Companies engaged in 
warehousing or in servicing products 
for reexport receive a 50 percent 
discount on export profits. A company 
engaged in consulting, engineering, or 
management can take home 50 percent 
tax-free income from overseas projects. 
When local companies promote 
exports in foreign trade fairs, conduct 
foreign market studies, or publish 
promotional export materials, they get a 
double deduction for expenses 
incurred, subject to certain limitations. 
As for the banking and financial 
services sector, profits generated from 
loans to borrowers outside Singapore 
are taxed at the minimal rate of 
10 percent. 
This wealth of incentives has proven 
successful in attracting foreign capital 
and expertise to Singapore. However, 
the tack which Singapore must take to 
justify its recent wage increases must be 
bold; otherwise, its competitive stance 
may be lost against such low-wage 
cities as Manila, Djakarta, or even Kuala 
Lumpur. Productivity must improve 
radically; the value added to raw 
materials must be high; and research 
and development for high technology 
products will have to be encouraged. 
The 1982 budget was structured to 
increase productivity, (including 
through personal income tax cuts) and 
to encourage industries in the services 
sector. The targeted productivity 
increase is between 6 to 8 percent 
annually. Computer programming, 
consulting, and financial services are 
the areas which the government hopes 
to be the leading edge of the 10 percent 
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inflation-adjusted growth of the 
economy. If the government succeeds 
in its objective (and on its track record 
alone there is no reason why it 
shouldn't) Singaporeans will reach 
japan's current level of per capita GNP 
by the end of this decade. 
As a financial centre, the government 
has several ideas to attract insurance 
services and fund management 
services. More regional and interna-
tional companies will be encouraged to 
list their shares on the local stock 
exchange. Members of the Singapore 
Gold Exchange, either as brokers or 
dealers, are now taxed 10 percent on 
transactions in gold bullion. 
In order to sell high skill and high 
value-added medical services, tax 
incentives are being considered for 
investment in hospitals and in medical 
equipment. Apart from training more 
doctors, Singapore's medical registry 
will be opened to qualified foreign 
doctors without the necessity of 
reciprocity. 
Tax liberalisation policies also are 
being studied to include: 
• Revised depreciation schedules to 
encourage automation. 
• Accelerated depreciation for 
computers and R & D equipment. 
• Further incentives for R & D . 
• Incentives for offshore leasing. 
The overall development strategy is 
to encourage Singaporeans to change 
their work ethic, to study more, and to 
produce more goods and services with 
practically the same number of workers 
in the same amount of time. There will 
be no room for idle hands or minds. In 
return, workers will get higher pay and 
lower taxes. 
To some this is an ideal; to others it 
may be an unacceptable regimentation. 
Many say it takes away the very creative 
and innovative force that propels 
growth in Singapore today. Lee Kuan 
Yew does not really have a successor as 
the chief executive officer of Singapore, 
Inc. There is little doubt that the 
eloquent leadership and imagination of 
this Cambridge-educated barrister will 
pull the plan through to the next 
decade. His successor, however, may 
have problems. With a higher standard 
of living comes such mundane ideas as 
flexibility, less regimentation, and more 
freedom. 
Some students have started to 
grumble. A member of parliament in 
opposition to Lee Kuan Yew's People's 
Action Party was elected in an October 
by-election—the first time this has 
occurred since the sixties. The challenge 
of the future is how to loosen the reins 
of government. Singaporeans may no 
longer be content after three years of an 
annual 20 percent pay increase. They 
may start to ask, if not demand, intan-
gible benefits. As a petite student of 
French in Singapore's National Univer-
sity aptly put it, "Singaporeans will no 
longer be content with what is 
mandated they should get. We will 
stand up one day instead of simply 
sitting under a tree waiting for Godot." 
HONG KONG 
A family of four, on arriving in Hong 
Kong from Manhattan, took a taxi 
through the harbour tunnel. When the 
taxi surfaced on the Hong Kong side, 
the four-year-old girl told her father, 
"Papa, we are home." Obviously, the 
little girl thought they had just crossed 
the Lincoln Tunnel under the Hudson 
and surfaced amidst towering buildings 
on 42nd Street. 
Hong Kong's population, like that of 
Manhattan's, lives and works at an 
urgent pace—the pedestrians weaving 
their way through the congested noisy 
traffic or hurrying along crowded 
pavements from one air-conditioned 
office to the next. Shops in Central 
Hong Kong are as elegant as those on 
Fifth Avenue in midtown. Shopkeepers 
in both cities are not there to develop 
sales; they are there to sell, period. 
Students of history probably will 
conclude that it was simply an aberra-
tion in the normal course of human 
events when, in the second half of the 
1940s, 600,000 people packed into one 
small island and a tiny beachhead on 
the rugged South China coast remained 
insulated from an upheaval that 
changed the lives of one of every four 
human beings on this planet. Hong 
Kong emerged from World War II with 
a devastated economy. But entrepre-
neurs were quick to reestablish their 
warehouses. Between 1947 and 1957, 
the value of total trade increased at an 
annual average of 35 percent. 
In 1952 disaster struck the colony 
when the United Nations imposed a 
trade embargo on China. Exports to 
China plummeted from HK$1.6 billion 
to HK$100 million 10 years later. 
Meanwhile, as refugees from China 
were swelling the population, the U.S. 
and the U.K. quickly replaced China as 
the largest markets for Hong Kong's 
exports—which became light, locally 
manufactured goods. Thus, the trade 
embargo with China forced a structural 
change in Hong Kong's economy, from 
essentially one of trading to one of 
fabrication and manufacturing. 
Thus transformed, Hong Kong 
entered the 1960s well equipped to 
cash in on the rapid expansion of world 
trade. Manufacturing became the 
largest contributor to the GDP and to 
employment. In that decade, exports 
from Hong Kong to the world increased 
by more than 300 percent. The popula-
tion increased, too; today it stands at 
five million. 
The discipline of the marketplace 
appears to have worked well in terms of 
trade and the restructuring of industry 
in Hong Kong. The former financial 
secretary (now chief secretary) of the 
British colonial administration, Sir Philip 
Haddon Cave, said, "I believe passion-
ately that if the mixed economy as we 
know it is to survive, the free-market 
forces should dictate the economic life 
of the community." Nowhere is this 
better illustrated than in the realm of 
fiscal policy. Hong Kong, to many 
investors and professionals, is a "tax 
haven." With the corporate income tax 
at 16.5 percent and individual income 
tax at 15 percent, Hong Kong indeed 
appears to be a comparatively low tax 
jurisdiction. 
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This tax structure has been used as a 
model by conservative economists to 
demonstrate that low taxation propels 
economic growth and that it has been 
the primary instrument in transforming 
Hong Kong into an industrialised 
economy. However, any society at this 
stage of development requires govern-
ment infrastructural support to 
function. Hong Kong provides such 
support. It has free medical services for 
the needy government hospitals, some 
of the free world's most extensive (per 
capita) public housing, and a very good, 
albeit crowded, road network. These 
services require tremendous amounts 
of capital investment, of course, but the 
capital comes not from tax revenues. It 
comes from income of a capital nature. 
Estimated revenue and receipts for 
tax revenues in 1980-1981 amounted to 
about 38 percent of the total govern-
ment revenue. Land sales, revenue from 
property and investments, and rates 
on real property account for over 
40 percent of the total government 
revenue. Because it directly benefits the 
government to keep land prices and 
redevelopment fees extremely high, 
rents and real estate prices are the 
highest in the world. The government 
finances all of its capital expenditures 
from the income derived from its 
capital—that is, land, since practically all 
of it belongs to the government as the 
Crown lessor. Thus, the taxpayer may be 
paying low taxes, but his rent is sky 
high. In terms of take-home pay and 
costs to the employer, Hong Kong is 
more expensive than either New York 
or London. 
The euphemism used by the colonial 
administration to describe its fiscal 
policy is "neutrality." Again, in Sir 
Philip's words, neutrality means "neutral 
with regard to the growth rate of the 
economy, neutral as regards to cost/ 
price structure, at least neutral and 
preferably (positive) to enterprise and 
investment. Having designed our fiscal 
policy... if the consequence is that we 
have a lot lower-based tax system, that 
is the consequence... it's not an 
objective." 
Therefore, Hong Kong does not grant 
any tax incentives to investors, whether 
foreign or domestic. With compara-
tively low tax rates, foreign investors do 
not look for or expect tax breaks or tax 
holidays. On the other hand, the same 
foreign investors, with their unflinching 
allegiance to free enterprise and to fair, 
open competiton, are vociferous in 
protesting against the "unconscionable" 
price of office space and living accom-
modations. These free enterprisers are, 
ironically, the vanguard of the forces for 
rent controls. Rightly or wrongly, the 
action of these foreign investors is 
simply a logical and opposite reaction 
to Hong Kong's neutral fiscal pol icy-
neutral to the taxation of enterprises 
and individuals but monopolistic and 
manipulative vis-a-vis property prices. 
Despite higher rental and even 
higher taxation of offshore earnings of 
banks situated in the Colony (16.5 
percent vs. 10 percent in Singapore), 
Hong Kong remains the international 
financial centre of Asia. The growth of 
the financial services sector is nothing 
short of phenomenal. In less than 
10 years (1971-79) its contribution to the 
GDP increased from 14 percent to 
21 percent. The initial stimulus that 
triggered the expansion was the 
consistent growth performance of the 
economy. Also contributing was a 
policy of positive noninterventionism 
in the economy and, more particularly, 
of minimum regulation of, and 
minimum reporting requirements for, 
banks and other financial institutions, 
plus a stable fiscal system with relatively 
low tax rates. 
Any guesstimate as to Hong Kong's 
future must necessarily dwell on the 
expiration of its lease. Indeed, given that 
1997 is but 14 years away, it is becoming 
exceedingly difficult for many to 
comprehend how today's accelerated 
growth can be sustained in trading, 
manufacturing, and financial services. 
What the U.K. will do is hardly 
relevant. The standard line here is that 
all it will take is a telephone call from 
China advising that the People's Army is 
moving in, and the Prince of Wales' 
own Gurkha Rifles will move out. Nor is 
international law really the issue. What 
matters is that China does not recog-
nize what it refers to as the "unequal 
treaty" which ceded Hong Kong in 
perpetuity and leased the New Terri-
tories to the U.K. The economics of 
China's tolerance of the British 
"managemenf'of the Colony is what 
really counts. 
About 70 percent of Hong Kong's 
water supply comes from China. 
Practically all of its fresh food comes 
from China. It is reported that about 
25 percent of the credit extended to 
Hong Kong borrowers is provided by 
China's 13 banks and finance companies 
operating in Hong Kong. On the other 
hand, Hong Kong is the prime source of 
China's foreign exchange. Estimates 
vary, but between 40 percent and 
70 percent of China's hard currency is 
earned from or through Hong Kong. 
China's government corporations are 
major investors in Hong Kong real 
estate as well as the stock market. 
Many observers rely on these facts to 
reinforce the belief that China will 
simply not make that telephone call. 
The proposition most businessmen, 
political observers, and China watchers 
agree on is this: as long as China needs 
a window to trade with the world, a 
place to raise foreign exchange, and a 
training ground on how to deal with a 
free-market economy, it will not make 
that telephone call. If, in 14 years, it can 
open new windows, find other markets 
to raise hard currency, and develop new 
training grounds for its cadres in free 
enterprises, it may yet make that 
call—collect. But why should China 
want Hong Kong back? The answer is 
simple: it is Chinese; and it is China. & 
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